Taxes Discourage Production

第5章 税负抑制生产
 
There is a still further factor which makes it improbable that the wealth created by government spending will fully compensate for the wealth destroyed by the taxes imposed to pay for that spending. It is not a simple question, as so often supposed, of taking something out of the nation’s right-hand pocket to put into its left-hand pocket. The government spenders tell us, for example, that if the national income is $1,500 billion then federal taxes of $360 billion a year would mean that only 24 percent of the national income is being transferred from private purposes to public purposes. This is to talk as if the country were the same sort of unit of pooled resources as a huge corporation, and as if all that were involved were a mere bookkeeping transaction. The government spenders forget that they are taking the money from A in order to pay it to B. Or rather, they know this very well but while they dilate upon all the benefits of the process to B, and all the wonderful things he will have which he would not have had if the money had not been transferred to him, they forget the effects of the transaction on A. B is seen; A is forgotten.

除开前面所讲的，还存在着一个因素，使得政府支出所创造的财富也就不可能完全补偿其征税所破坏的财富。人们通常简单地认为政府支出就是把国家的钱从右边的口袋掏出来，再放进左边的口袋，整个问题不是这么简单。比如，主张扩大政府支出的人告诉我们，如果国民所得一年是1.5万亿美元，联邦税收是3 600亿美元，那么就只有24%的国民所得从私人用途转到公共用途{endnotes:1989年的国民收入为6.2万亿美元（按1993年的美元币值计算）。当年的联邦税收为2.4万亿美元，约占国民收入的40%。（杰拉尔德·斯卡利[Gerald W. Scully]：〈什么是最优政府规模〉[What  is the Optimal Size of Government?], NCPA报告第188号，1994年11月.）}。这种说法就好像把整个国家当成资源汇聚在一处的大公司，资源转移只是账面上的调整而已。这帮主张扩大政府支出的人忘记了，政府支出必定需要首先从甲那里拿走那一笔钱，然后才能给乙，他们或许十分清楚这个道理，但他们只谈这个过程给乙带来的那些好处，如果不把钱转移给乙，这些美好的东西就不会发生，他们忘记了此类操作对甲造成的影响。乙能够被看见，而甲就避而不谈。
 
In our modern world there is never the same percentage of income tax levied on everybody. The great burden of income taxes is imposed on a minor percentage of the nation’s income; and these income taxes have to be supplemented by taxes of other kinds. These taxes inevitably affect the actions and incentives of those from whom they are taken. When a corporation loses a hundred cents of every dollar it loses, and is permitted to keep only fifty-two cents of every dollar it gains, and when it cannot adequately offset its years of losses against its years of gains, its policies are affected. It does not expand its operations, or it expands only those attended with a minimum of risk. People who recognize this situation are deterred from starting new enterprises. Thus old employers do not give more employment, or not as much more as they might have; and others decide not to become employers at all. Improved machinery and better-equipped factories come into existence much more slowly than they otherwise would. The result in the long run is that consumers are prevented from getting better and cheaper products to the extent that they otherwise would, and that real wages are held down, compared with what they might have been.

在现代社会中，每个人所承受的所得税比例不尽相同。所得税的巨大负担被强加于国民收入的一小部分之上，为了弥补公共开支的不足，政府还必须开征其他名目的赋税。这些赋税最终都会影响到交税者的行为与生产动力。如果一家公司发生亏损，每赔一块钱，就得足足损失一块钱；当这家公司赚钱的时候，每赚一块钱，却只能留下52分钱，当它不能用丰年的收益去弥补亏损期的损失时，公司的经营政策就会受到影响，它将丧失扩张业务的冲动，或者只扩张那些风险最低的业务。觉察到这种状况的人甚至会打消开创新事业的念头。现有的雇主将不再提供更多就业机会，或者不再象他本可以提供的那样多，其他人则根本不打算成为雇主。长期下来，与本来可以达到的水准相比，新设备和新工艺的应用放慢。最终结果是，相对那样的水准而言，消费者买不到更好更便宜的产品，实际工资达不到应有的水平。
 
There is a similar effect when personal incomes are taxed 50, 60 or 70 percent. People begin to ask themselves why they should work six, eight or nine months of the entire year for the government, and only six, four or three months for themselves and their families. If they lose the whole dollar when they lose, but can keep only a fraction of it when they win, they decide that it is foolish to take risks with their capital. In addition, the capital available for risk-taking itself shrinks enormously. It is being taxed away before it can be accumulated. In brief, capital to provide new private jobs is first prevented from coming into existence, and the part that does come into existence is then discouraged from starting new enterprises. The government spenders create the very problem of unemployment that they profess to solve.

当个人所得税率调升至50%、60%或70%时，也会产生同样的效果。人们将开始扪心自问：辛辛苦苦一年下来，为什么有6个月、8个月甚至9个月全是在为政府做贡献，只剩下6个月、4个月甚至3个月的所得供自己和家人使用？赔钱的时候，自己必须承担全部损失，赚钱的时候却只能留下一小部分利润，他们会认为，拿自己的钱去冒这种风险未免愚不可及。再者，他们也没有多余的钱拿去冒险，因为资本还没有累积就已经被征收走了。简单而言，用于创造民营工作机会的资本不能成形，已成形的资本则被阻止了发起新的企业，主张扩大政府支出的人，正好创造了他们宣称想要解决的失业问题。
 
A certain amount of taxes is of course indispensable to carry on essential government functions. Reasonable taxes for this purpose need not hurt production much. The kind of government services then supplied in return, which among other things safeguard production itself, more than compensate for this. But the larger the percentage of the national income taken by taxes the greater the deterrent to private production and employment. When the total tax burden grows beyond a bearable size, the problem of devising taxes that will not discourage and disrupt production becomes insoluble.

当然，为了执行基本的政府职能，一定数量的税收必不可少，围绕这个目的的合理税收对生产不会造成太大的损害。此类政府职能除了其它方面，也为生产提供了保障，此种保障提供的效益超过弥补生产者税收上的损失。但是，以税收形式征取的国民收入的百分比越大，对于私人生产和就业的阻碍和威胁就越大。等到总税负大到超过了一个可以承受的限度时，政府又想课税又想不至于抑制和破坏生产，将成为一个不可能解决的问题。