Economics in One Lesson校译之17. Government Price-Fixing (5-1,2)

Government Price-Fixing

第17章 政府价格管制
 
We have seen what some of the effects are of governmental efforts to fix the prices of commodities above the levels to which free markets would otherwise have carried them. Let us now look at some of the results of government attempts to hold the prices of commodities below their natural market levels.

我们已经分析了政府试图将商品价格限定在自由市场水平之上的做法,看到了由此造成的一些影响。现在让我们来看一下,当政府努力将商品价格限定在自然水平之下时,有可能会带来一些什么样的后果。
 
The latter attempt is made in our day by nearly all governments in wartime. We shall not examine here the wisdom of wartime price-fixing. The whole economy, in total war, is necessarily dominated by the State, and the complications that would have to be considered would carry us too far beyond the main question with which this book is concerned.* But wartime price-fixing, wise or not, is in almost all countries continued for at least long periods after the war is over, when the original excuse for starting it has disappeared.

当今各国政府在战时几乎都做过这后一种努力。确实,在战争期间,国民经济全部由国家控制是必然的,我们在这里不会去探究战时管制价格的学问,要去探究就必须考虑战时的复杂状况,这会使我们远离本书所关注的主题。{footnotes: 不过,在这一点上我自己的结论是,尽管在战争期间,政府的优先要求权、分配权或定量配给可能是不可避免的,但管制价格造成的伤害尤为突出。虽然要达到实现最高限价的目的,往往需要结合配给制,但即便就暂时的情况而言,实施配给则不一定要结合最高限价。}不过,无论战时管制价格的做法明智与否,几乎所有的国家在战后很长一段时间内仍在实施价格管制,即使当初启动价格管制的理由已经不复存在。
 
It is the wartime inflation that mainly causes the pressure for price-fixing. At the time of writing, when practically every country is inflating, though most of them are at peace, price controls are always hinted at, even when they are not imposed. Though they are always economically harmful, if not destructive, they have at least a political advantage from the standpoint of the officeholders.By implication they put the blame for higher prices on the greed and rapacity of businessmen, instead of on the inflationary monetary policies of the officeholders themselves.

战时通货膨胀是产生政府启动价格管制压力的主要原因。本书撰稿时,大多数国家安享和平,但都存在着通货膨胀,各国政府总会萌发管制物价的念头,即便没有真正实施。虽说管制物价在经济上一定有害,甚至是破坏性的,不过对于政府官员至少具有一项政治上的好处——管制价格等于暗示物价上涨应归咎于企业家的贪婪,官员们往往只字不提政府实行的货币政策才是造成通货膨胀压力的主要原因。
 
Let us first see what happens when the government tries to keep the price of a single commodity, or a small group of commodities, below the price that would be set in a free competitive market.

首先,让我们分析一下,当政府试图将单一商品、或者一小部分商品的价格维持在低于自由竞争市场的价格水平时,会发生什么样的情形。
 
When the government tries to fix maximum prices for only a few items, it usually chooses certain basic necessities, on the ground that it is most essential that the poor be able to obtain these at a “reasonable” cost. Let us say that the items chosen for this purpose are bread, milk and meat.

当政府准备只管制一小部分商品的最高价格时,通常会选择那些关系到民生的必需品,官员们会说,确保穷人能够以“合理”的价格,买得起生活必需品,这比什么都重要。我们假设为此选定的商品是面包、牛奶和肉类。
 
The argument for holding down the price of these goods will run something like this: If we leave beef (let us say) to the mercies of the free market, the price will be pushed up by competitive bidding so that only the rich will get it. People will get beef not in proportion to their need, but only in proportion to their purchasing power. If we keep the price down, everyone will get his fair share.

主张压低生活必需品价格的理由是这样的:如果我们任由市场去决定牛肉的价格,那么,价格会由于被争相购买而被抬得很高,以至于只有富人才买得起。这样一来,人们得到的牛肉就不再与他们的基本需要成正比,而仅仅是与他们的购买力成正比。如果我们压低牛肉价格,每个人都能得到公平的一份。
 
The first thing to be noticed about this argument is that if it is valid the policy adopted is inconsistent and timorous. For if purchasing power rather than need determines the distribution of beef at a market price of $2.25 cents a pound, it would also determine it, though perhaps to a slightly smaller degree, at, say, a legal “ceiling” price of $1.50 cents a pound. The purchasing-power-rather-than-need argument, in fact, holds as long as we charge anything for beef whatever. It would cease to apply only if beef were given away.

关于这一论调首先要注意的是,如果它是有依据的,那么,所采取的这种政策既无法保持前后一致又无法把握其分寸。因为,假若以每磅2.25美分的市场价格决定牛肉分配的,是购买力而非基本需要,那么,即便将法定“限价”降到1.50美分,其分配将同样是由购买力决定的,只不过依赖程度可能会稍小一些。事实上,只要牛肉还需要拿钱去买,这种“由购买力而非需要决定”(purchasing-power-rather-than-need)观点总是适用的。只有在牛肉免费奉送时才不适用。
 
But schemes for maximum price-fixing usually begin as efforts to “keep the cost of living from rising.” And so their sponsors unconsciously assume that there is something peculiarly “normal” or sacrosanct about the market price at the moment from which their control starts. That starting or previous price is regarded as “reasonable,” and any price above that as “unreasonable,” regardless of changes in the conditions of production or demand since that starting price was first established.

政府出台限定最高价格的措施时,往往强调是为了“使生活费用不再上涨”。这个说法预设了有个 “正常” 的或神圣不可侵犯的特定价格存在。这个特定价格或以前的低价格,被视为“合理的”,比它高的任何价格都是“不合理的”,而不去管特定价格设定之后,生产或需求状况所发生的变化。

2

In discussing this subject, there is no point in assuming a price control that would fix prices exactly where a free market would place them in any case. That would be the same as having no price control at all. We must assume that the purchasing power in the hands of the public is greater than the supply of goods available, and that prices are being held down by the government below the levels to which a free market would put them.

在讨论这个主题时,若假设政府把价格刚好限定在自由市场价位,就没有意义了。因为,那就和根本不实行价格管制没有两样。我们必须假设市民的购买力大于商品的供给水平,并且政府限价低于自由市场价位。

Now we cannot hold the price of any commodity below its market level without in time bringing about two consequences. The first is to increase the demand for that commodity. Because the commodity is cheaper, people are both tempted to buy, and can afford to buy, more of it. The second consequence is to reduce the supply of that commodity. Because people buy more, the accumulated supply is more quickly taken from the shelves of merchants. But in addition to this, production of that commodity is discouraged. Profit margins are reduced or wiped out. The marginal producers are driven out of business. Even the most efficient producers may be called upon to turn out their product at a loss. This happened in World War II when slaughter houses were required by the Office of Price Administration to slaughter and process meat for less than the cost to them of cattle on the hoof and the labor of slaughter and processing.

现在,我们知道,当商品价格被人为限制在它的市场价位之下时,不可避免地会带来两个后果。第一是导致受控商品的需求增加。由于该商品变得便宜,图便宜的人会更多,人们也买得起更多。第二是导致受控商品供给减少。由于人们买得更多,商家的存货也销得快,而与此同时,该产品的生产却受到了阻碍。降价致使该商品收益率降低,甚至做不出利润。边际生产者被迫出局。即使最有效率的生产者也可能亏本经营。这种事情就曾在二次世界大战期间发生过,当时的屠宰场在美国物价管制局要求下,以低于购买活牛和雇用屠宰加工工人的成本的售价,持续屠宰和加工肉制品。

If we did nothing else, therefore, the consequence of fixing a maximum price for a particular commodity would be to bring about a shortage of that commodity. But this is precisely the opposite of what the government regulators originally wanted to do. For it is the very commodities selected for maximum price-fixing that the regulators most want to keep in abundant supply. But when they limit the wages and the profits of those who make these commodities, without also limiting the wages and profits of those who make luxuries or semiluxuries, they discourage the production of the price-controlled necessities while they relatively stimulate the production of less essential goods.

如果政府暂不采取其他措施,价格限制将造成受控商品出现短缺。这恰好与政府内制定法规人员的初衷背道而驰。因为那些被选定的限价商品,都是政府最希望其保持充足供应的商品。但是,当他们限定了这些产品生产者的工资和利润水平,而没有限制奢侈品或其它非必需品生产者的工资与利润时,他们就阻碍了制造商们去生产价格受控的必需品,而相应地刺激了非必需品的生产。

Some of these consequences in time become apparent to the regulators, who then adopt various other devices and controls in an attempt to avert them. Among these devices are rationing, cost-control, subsidies, and universal price-fixing. Let us look at each of these in turn.

政府内制定法规的人员迟早会认识到其中一些后果。接下来,他们就会采取其他各种办法和管制措施,来尽力避免出现类似的局面。这些措施包括配给制、成本管制、补贴和全面管制价格。我们来一一讨论这些措施。

When it becomes obvious that a shortage of some commodity is developing as a result of a price fixed below the market, rich consumers are accused of taking “more than their fair share”; or, if it is a raw material that enters into manufacture, individual firms are accused of “hoarding” it. The government then adopts a set of rules concerning who shall have priority in buying that commodity, or to whom and in what quantities it shall be allocated, or how it shall be rationed. If a rationing system is adopted, it means that each consumer can have only a certain maximum supply, no matter how much he is willing to pay for more.

到了某种商品因价格被规定在市场水平之下而出现显著的短缺之后,有钱的消费者往往遭到指责,说他们得到的必需品“超过公平份额”;要是受控商品是生产用的原材料,就有公司会被指责为“囤积居奇”。鉴于此,政府会推出一系列规定,指定谁有优先购买该商品的特权,或者由政府机关决定分配给谁,分配多少,如何分配。一旦实施配给制度,就意味每位消费者,不论他愿意以多高的价钱购买更多的某种商品,他都只能得到某一最大限额的配给。

If a rationing system is adopted, in brief, it means that the government adopts a double price system, or a dual currency system, in which each consumer must have a certain number of coupons or “points” in addition to a given amount of ordinary money. In other words, the government tries to do through rationing part of the job that a free market would have done through prices. I say only part of the job, because rationing merely limits the demand without also stimulating the supply, as a higher price would have done.

总之,一旦采取了配给制度,就意味着政府采取的是双重价格体系,或者是双重货币体系,在这个体系中,每位消费者除了持有一定数量的钱币,还必须拥有一定数量的票券或“额度”,才能买到东西。换句话说,政府限价市场试图通过配给,去起到自由市场通过价格所起到的部分作用。之所以说只是“部分作用”,是因为配给只限制需求,而不能象更高的价格那样,还能刺激供给。

The government may try to assure supply through extending its control over the costs of production of a commodity. To hold down the retail price of beef, for example, it may fix the wholesale price of beef, the slaughter-house price of beef, the price of live cattle, the price of feed, the wages of farmhands. To hold down the delivered price of milk, it may try to fix the wages of milk truck drivers, the price of containers, the farm price of milk, the price of feedstuffs. To fix the price of bread, it may fix the wages in bakeries, the price of flour, the profits of millers, the price of wheat, and so on.

为了保证受控商品实现持续供应,政府可能扩大管制受控商品的生产成本。比方说,为了使牛肉的零售价格保持在低水平,政府可能限定牛肉的批发价格、屠宰场的牛肉价格、活牛的价格、饲料的价格、农场工人的工资。为了压低牛奶的送达价格,政府可能限定牛奶送货司机的工资、奶品包装的价格、农场的牛奶价格、饲料价格。为了压低面包的价格,政府可能限定面包师的工资、面粉的价格、粮食加工企业的利润、小麦的价格等等。

But as the government extends this price-fixing backwards, it extends at the same time the consequences that originally drove it to this course. Assuming that it has the courage to fix these costs, and is able to enforce its decisions, then it merely, in turn, creates shortages of the various factors — labor, feedstuffs, wheat, or whatever—that enter into the production of the final commodities. Thus the government is driven to controls in ever-widening circles, and the final consequence will be the same as that of universal price-fixing.

然而,当政府继续扩大受控商品范围的时候,无非是扩大了我们在前面所指出的价格管制的后果。假使政府有魄力有能力去限定受控商品的成本,成本控制也只会导致受控商品的各种生产要素(如劳工、饲料、小麦等等)出现短缺。这么一来,政府不得不继续扩大受控商品的范围,而其最终的结果与全面的价格管制是相同的。

The government may try to meet this difficulty through subsidies. It recognizes, for example, that when it keeps the price of milk or butter below the level of the market, or below the relative level at which it fixes other prices, a shortage may result because of lower wages or profit margins for the production of milk or butter as compared with other commodities. Therefore the government attempts to compensate for this by paying a subsidy to the milk and butter producers. Passing over the administrative difficulties involved in this, and assuming that the subsidy is just enough to assure the desired relative production of milk and butter, it is clear that, though the subsidy is paid to producers, those who are really being subsidized are the consumers. For the producers are on net balance getting no more for their milk and butter than if they had been allowed to charge the free market price in the first place; but the consumers are getting their milk and butter at a great deal below the free market price. They are being subsidized to the extent of the difference—that is, by the amount of subsidy paid ostensibly to the producers.

政府可能采取的另一种解决问题的方法,是提供补贴。例如,他们认识到,当把牛奶或黄油价格限定在市场价位之下,甚至与其他受控商品价格相比较都偏低,短缺就可能发生。因为生产牛奶或黄油的工资及收益率,还比不上生产其他商品。政府为了补救这种现象,对牛奶和黄油的生产者进行补贴。我们姑且忽略推行补贴在行政上的种种困难,并且假设补贴刚好足够确保牛奶和黄油得以持续生产,很明显,尽管补贴是提供给生产者的,但真正得到补贴的却是消费者。因为,生产者从净收益上讲并没有比允许他们以自由市场价格出售其牛奶黄油时得到的更多,而消费者却以远低于自由市场价格的水平买到了这些产品。两者的差价,正是他们获得的补贴金额——也就是政府表面上付给生产者的补贴金额。

Now unless the subsidized commodity is also rationed, it is those with the most purchasing power that can buy most of it. This means that they are being subsidized more than those with less purchasing power. Who subsidizes the consumers will depend upon the incidence of taxation. But men in their role of taxpayers will be subsidizing themselves in their role of consumers. It becomes a little difficult to trace in this maze precisely who is subsidizing whom. What is forgotten is that subsidies are paid for by someone, and that no method has been discovered by which the community gets something for nothing.

现在,除非接受补贴的商品也实施配给,否则购买力最强的人会买得最多。这意味着,他们得到的补贴会比购买力较低的人更多。到底谁补贴了消费者,取决于政府如何征税。如果既是纳税人又是消费者,便是自己补贴自己。若接受补贴的商品很多,要辨别谁补贴谁就让人晕头转向了。然而有一点应当是明确的,那就是,补贴的钱必须由某些人来买单,并不存在什么可以使公众得到某种好处而不必付出任何代价的方法。

(未完待续)

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